The Long Descent to Unilateralism

World War I was a flash point in the balance of power between the branches.

n the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the war over war powers demonstrated a healthy, albeit messy, constitutional system. In both branches, there were battles about when and where the US should use its military and how large that military should be. These questions would shape deliberations between the executive and legislative branches for decades, with men in both branches attempting to assert their preferences, and they would claim those who disagreed did not have a proper understanding of the founding principles. Arguably, those who favored a larger military capable of helping the US become a great power tended to win out, even in the early years. Only a few decades after independence, they doubled the size of the US with the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, followed by the acquisition of the Floridas in 1819, the annexation of Texas in 1845, the acquisition of the Oregon territory in 1846, and finally seizing half of Mexico’s territory by the end of the war in 1848. Those who hoped for a larger military could point to the expansive territory and the two oceans as a justification for increasing the size of the military.

The desire to move across North America did not come exclusively from the executive branch. Voices in both branches wanted continental dominance, and they won out over those whose preference was for a small republic. Even in the nineteenth century, when the United States was considered isolationist, these acquisitions and the Mexican-American War showed a clear victory for those with grand ambitions for the United States and its place in the world.

During this time, we do not see presidential unilateralism. If a president wished to initiate a military operation, he would ask Congress for permission to purchase territory or start a war—in Jefferson’s case, he asked for forgiveness after a fait accompli. Congress, in turn, would engage in a meaningful debate about the merits of the action, and provide him with permission or deny it. Subsequently, if a war effort proved questionable or problematic, they would again debate the merits of the prosecution of the war and hold the executive accountable. During an operation, spending would increase, and a president would have more power. At the conclusion of the operation, the military would draw down, and Congress would return to its coequal status.

This changed with the Spanish-American War. President William McKinley assumed a great deal of power—at the expense of Congress—and military spending started ratcheting up. The healthy push and pull over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries between the branches began eroding then continued to do so through WWI. The healthy balance never returned after WWII. The Cold War and the War on Terror then exacerbated an already problematic relationship. Congress did not have the incentives to reassert its coequal status. This is certainly problematic for the separation of powers and the health of the constitutional system; there is a bigger problem. Congress facilitated unilateral presidential decision-making when it comes to the military without much oversight from the people, the courts, or Congress. This lack of deliberation and accountability has led to the operationalization of bad policy. This policy creates new security threats rather than diminishing them, and we have seen decades without a coherent grand strategy. Despite mountains of evidence proving the need for a more assertive Congress, presidents continue to make the same kind of mistakes in military engagements, large and small.

World War I

World War I was a flash point in the balance of power between the branches, with Congress standing firm against a president encroaching on legislative powers. In the early days of the war, Congress and President Woodrow Wilson agreed that the US should stay neutral. The sinking of the passenger ship, Lusitania, in 1915 changed their thinking. At this point, Wilson felt compelled to bring the United States into the fight due to the immorality of the Germans. He followed the steps outlined in the Constitution and solidified by nineteenth-century norms: He produced a war message for Congress explaining that he had exhausted every diplomatic avenue available. He emphasized the inhumanity of the Germans and requested a declaration of war, which Congress then provided. In the declaration, it claimed that the Imperial German Government (not the people) was at war with the American Government and that the German government was the aggressor. As a consequence, “the President … is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful term.”

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